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The vzolence and logic components of conjkt resolutron are totally Interdependent --they cannot be apphed m zsolatlon Today we see that logtc would have the North Koreans voluntarily grve up therr nuclear program to reap the economic benefirs that would accrue to therr people /I?'owever,) we know that Kim Ii! Sung (kas) no stranger to violence, and Iye dare not rely on logic alone in dealing wzth the North Koreans Admiral Charles R Larson, USN Commander m Chief C S Pacific Command (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) The evident effort of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to obtain nuclear weapons is one of the most slgmficant challenges to U S national secmty today. The issue came to a head over North Korea' s March 1993 announcement of its intention to withdraw ffrom the Nuclear Non-prohferatlon Treaty (YPT) In October 1994. a basis for resolution was accepted by the U S and North Korea m their Agreed Framework The Framework commlts North Korea to remam an NPT party and provides a means for ensuring that it does not acquire nuclear weapons The purpose of this paper 1s to consider measures taken by the U S roughly from 1992 to 1994 designed to achieve its objectives regarding North Korea's nuclear efforts --/ nonprohferatlon, avoidance of war. and assurance of allies The focus of the analysis will be on Washmgton's use of military power to reach these obJectIves, though it ml1 also be important to consldei the other instruments of power used by the U S m this process The paper will demonstrate that the pohtlcal use of military power, m conJunctlon with the other mstrurnents, was essential to the accomplishment of U S objectives Specifically, U S mlhtary power was necess T to blunt North Korean mlhtary options, making U S economic sanctzons credible and giving Pyongyang an incentive to accept a negotiated solution The military instrument was L generally not used as a means of directly influencing North Korean negotiating behavior, with the maJor exception of the use of the Team Spirit exercise as a bargammg chip
While the U S -DPRK agreement is only a "framework" for resolving the problem and is regarded by some observers as unlikely actually to do so, it has already accomplished some U.S objectives and offers a good opportunity to reach others This paper wrll not argue the extent to which the framework actually at-tams U S objectives but will largely assume that it represents some measure of success, although the jury is still out on this question The analysis of the US strategy to address the North Korean nuclear issue will consider 1) the context for the issue, 2) U S pohtical objectives, 3) U S mihtary objectives, and 4) the means brought to bear to accomphsh those objectives, not only those mlhtary but also those non-mlhtary 2 This analysis will then be used as the basis to consider lessons learned from the North Korean crrsis and the negotiations leading to the Agreed Framework
THE M
The North Korean nuclear issue dates to the 1950s. when the U S considered using atomic weapons durmg the Korean War After the war, the U S deployed tactical nuclear weapons m the Republic of Korea (ROK) and mdicated that it would retam the option of using nuclear weapons if necessary to stop any further North Korean mihtary aggression 3 As a consequence, Pyongyang decided as early as the 1950s to seek its own nuclear weapons capabrhty, a quest undertaken clandestmely and largely mdlgenously Nonetheless, m 1985 the DPRK yielded to mternational pressure by agreeing to sign the NPT, though it refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) --as required by the Treaty --until 1992 At the same time, according to some experts, U S mtelhgence indicated fact produced any nuclear weapons and decided to use them An Force and mtelhgence commuruty agencies were reported to have concluded that a mlhtary strike agamst the DPRK nuclear complex at Yongbyon "had a relatively low chance of success because so much of the complex 1s lndden m hillstdes or underground "'i Given these cn-cumstances, the U S emphasis was on deterrmg the use of North Korean mihtary power
Assurance of U S. Allies
The cr~ls was made particularly acute by the geographical proximity of U.S allies Japan and South Korea The ROK obviously had the most to lose, and Japan's concerns were growing as a result of increasing DPRK capablhtles to strike Japanese territory with ballishc missiles, as well as Tokyo's nightmare scenario of a united Korea m possession of nuclear weapons It was important for U S polmcal and security interests to assure these allies that North Korean nuclear capabilities would be mmimized through means that, for reasons given above, did not unduly risk conflrct This objective was important to ensure the stablhty of the region and avoid giving either ally an mcentive to reconsider its own nuclear weapon options Furthermore, the U.S.
sought solutions that would increase the opportumty for North-South polmcal dialogue and ultimate reunification, which appears to be the only means fully to resolve the nuclear problem Koreans] were to ever use, to develop and use nuclear weapons It would mean the end of then country as they know it '1'3 In spite of the U S withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, the US ability to strike North Korea with nuclear weapons, either from ancraft based outside the penmsula or from the continental C S , was not m question 9 The obJective of conventronal deterrence involved a trrckrer balance of having enough capabrhty and the stated mtentron to deter, while avoiding actions that could provoke a DPRK attack Some observers argued that not enough was being done to deter North Korean aggression, particularly gtven its threat to resort to military force if UN economic sanctions were imposed Representative James A Leach wrote of "a concern that inadequate attention has been paid to our bolstering our deterrent posture m South Korea and to reemphasrzmg the comnntrhent of the US to defend our treaty allies m Northeast Asia "'-I On the other hand, North Korea threatened to respond wrth force to unspecrfied U S and South Korean mrhtary measures, comphcatmg U S planmng The rusk of provokmg a conflict caused the U.S. to avoid certain mrhtary measures, though srgnrficant efforts were made to bolster the deterrent P Defense
The second mrhtary obJective was to be able to defend South Korea (and Japan, rf necessary) should deterrence fail Robert J Art explains the theoretical difference between deterrence and defense Deterrence and defense are alike m that both are intended to protect the state or its closest allies from physical attacks The purpose of both IS drssuasron --persuading others ti to undertake actions harmful to oneself. Defense dissuades by presenting an unvanqmshable mrhtary force Deterrence dissuades be presenting the certainty of retaliatory devastatron l5
A key U S mrhtary objective was thus to demonstrate to North Korea that use of force would not only mvrte great destructron on its terrrtory --for example, the President's statement behavior This pohcy amounts to appeasement and it has got to stop "I8 This kmd of concern led primarily; to Increased calls for a harder line in the form of international economic sanctions In forcing North Korea to pay a price for its nuclear defiance, a price that could be lifted once Pyongyang complied with its nonprohferation obligations, sanctions offered a compellent threat short of mlhtary action Moreover, vulnerabllmes in the DPRK economy suggested that sanctions could have a real impact rf they cut off the flow of or1 and hard currency The severity of North Korea's economrc plight meant that sanctions might force tough tradeoffs between expendrtures on nuclear and conventional mihtary forces However, as they often do, such sanctions carried a price for those imposmg them as well In particular, China --now North Korea's mam source of oil --would have to abandon its needy friend, and Japan would have to prevent the flow of remntances to North Korea from Koreans hvmg m Japan, which was regarded by Tokyo as polihcahy risky Chma's reluctance was the mam obstacle to the imposition of U N. sanctions. Another argument against sanctions was that, whatever price they imposed on North Korea, they were hkely to do little directly to address the nuclear problem and might even cause Pyongyang to accelerate its work on nuclear North Korea's mtentions are notoriously difficult to ascertain As Paul Bracken reminds us, its decisions about the use of mlhtary force were highly unpredictable However, the DPRK's frequently bellicose words mdlcate that it had every mtentron to resort to war rf pressed beyond a point on the nuclear issue When the cnsrs over special mspections that led to NPT vvlthdrawal was reaching its first peak m February 1993, the North Korean official newspaper Rodon Shmum threatened that "if a special mspection or sanctions are forced upon us and the mvlolable soil of our country IS mfrmged upon by big powers, it would result in plungmg the / whole land of the North and South mto the holocaust of a war tt30 When tensions over mspectibns were rising again m early 1994, President Kim 11 Sung said that "pressure or threat will have no effect on us Such an attempt may invite catastrophe, far from findmg a soluhon to the problem I'31 And as North-South talks broke down m March 1994, the North Korean delegate exclaimed that if the U S and ROK pressured his country on the nuclear issue, "Seoul wrll turn into a sea of fire ~32 It would be natural to discount thts harsh rhetoric as standard North Korean bluster To some extent of course, this is precisely what the words represented After all, one of North P-5 f Korea's objectives was to ensure that special inspections and sanchons were not imposed However, careful and responsible observers were unwrlhng to dismiss the threats as mere Measures Not Taken.. Other possible actions were not taken because they were considered unnecessary and/or overly provocative Some of these options would have been exercised only if strmgent mtemational sanctions against North Korea had been adopted Air and ground force troop levels were not mcreased, and F-15Es and F-117s were not deployed to the ROK However, it is conceivable that the fact that these were known to be optrons may have contributed to deterrence Team Spirit was not conducted m 1994, though as discussed below, I
that decision was related as much to the negotiatmg situation as to mlhtary readiness. Other optrons were not reported publicly but may have been considered, such as mcreasmg exercise activities other than Team Spntt, deploymg AWACS, maritime prepositiomng ships, and hospital ships, and conductmg special operations activities j7 22 Even if the relatively modest measures that were taken did not sigmficantly change the rmhtary balance on the penmsula, m the minds of the North Koreans they probably raised the price of carrying out then mihtary threats and thus reduced the chance that they would actually do so. This effect on then perceptions m turn forced them to take the threat of sanctrons seriously Ambassador Galluccl thmks that the mihtary measures taken were srgmficant in persuading the DPRK to seek a negotiated settlement, suggestmg that they were among the key factors that "condmoned the atmosphere for the talks " He suggested that even those actions not taken had an effect, m that the North Koreans expected that the U S would make further mihtary preparations in the absence of a deal In general, Gallucci believes that the outcome of the North Korean nuclear issue demonstrates that diplomacy can be enhanced rf the mrhtary posture that backs it up is strong 58 THE QUASI-MILITARY MEANS While these steps, as well as the ultimate deterrent of U S strategic nuclear weapons, served as sticks that convmced North Korea that it really had no mlhtary options, other measures offered carrots to North Korea for good behavior These political-mrhtary, or "quasi-mrhtary," measures included the Team Spirit exercise, the withdrawal of U S nuclear weapons from South Korea, and a U S assurance not to use nuclear weapons agamst North Korea Quasi-nnhtary measures will be defined as those that are mherently military m nature but that can be utrhzed m more of a pohtical fashion, given that they also have an inherently political element or that their mihtary sigmficance has dimmished
The process of using quasi-milrtary means to address the nuclear issue began wnh the I" cancellation of Team Spint 1992 and the withdrawal of U S nuclear weapons from South Korea
The credibihty of using tactical nuclear weapons, particularly m densely populated areas such as In June 1993, the North Korea did agree to suspend its NPT withdrawal in exchange for a U S assurance not to use nuclear weapons agamst North Korea, but a commitment not to hold
Team Spun was not included m the deal, nor did the DPRK agree to special mspections Given the failure to resolve the mspections impasse, ~1 hich was soon to be worsened by Pyongyang's obstruction of regular mspections on the grounds that North Korea was no longer subJect to full really too late to prevent the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability
The other nuclear programs of greatest concern --those of Iran, Iraq, and Libya --are so rudimentary that replacing them with new nuclear facilmes m a North Korea-type deal would be a net nonproliferation loss and is very unhkely to be acceptable to the international comrnunny Thus, the fear of a bad precedent needs to take account of the fact that m the real world there may be little chance that the precedent could be followed m the near term Should another country ofprolrferatlon concern obtarn a new capabrlzty to produce weapons-grade material, as h70rth Korea rnaJ> have done m the early 199Os, the example of a strategy combrnlng drplomatx, economrc, and mrlrta?y mstruments to create lncentrves to abJure nuclear weapons would be useful to conszder Both Michael Mazarr and Wllham Berry, authors of key works on the North Korean nuclear issue, have suggested that if such a strategy worked in a situation as difficult as that of the DPRK, it is likely to work elsewhere 66 The cmxrnstances of other prohferators will vary, but the successful strategy for dealing wrth North Korea 1s certamly worth careful study Indeed, the precedent set by the strategy to deal with North Korea has some rather positive aspects The DPRK has demonstrated that some countries' desire to undermme the mtemanonal status quo may be so strong that they will seek nuclear weapons m spite of being an NPT party and that these countries are not likely to accept a negotiated settlement without a sigmficant compellent threat, such as mtemational economic sanctions or use of military force Iraq has already shown itself to be such a country, Iran and Libya are other likely candidates.
29
The experience with the DPRK mdlcates that even the threat of economrc sanctrons can have a maJor impact on such a country, though it is possible that the threat would have an effect only rf the prohferator is m dire economic cncumstances, such as those of North Korea Like North Korea, the unpredictablhty and mihtancy of these states make it desirable that the "compellence" implications In addition, the leverage gamed from seeking to create bargammg chips may not be worth the bureaucratic or mtra-alhance controversies created by such efforts These problems suggest that future opportumties of this sort will probably have to be exploited as they arrse, as they were m both the Jupiter and Team Spirit cases, rather than actually being planned Furthermore, m the end, the most useful inducements are likely to be more purely pohtrcal and economc m nature (e g , diplomatic recogmtion. economic assistance)
Fznally, the most znzportant lessonfiom the esperzence wzth North Korea about the polztzcal use of mzlztarypower IS that zt may be necessary to deter and defend agaznst a heavzly armedprolzfer ator threatenzng mzlztary aggressron to reszst znternatzonal nonprolzferatzon pressures The posslbihty that such a country will already be m a position to use nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and the need to protect against such use through mihtary measures are the key issues addressed by counter-proliferation pohcy. The North Korean case suggests that mlhtary force may be useful m less direct ways to help persuade a prohferator not to seek nuclear weapons m the first place, or to stop whatever efforts it may have under way The key point 1s to remove the option that such a country might have to resort to force to achieve its obJectives, thereby confrontmg it with a choice of seekmg a negotiated settlement or accepting the consequences of any sanctions that might be applied ENDNOTES 1 Admiral Charles R Larson, "Personal Reflections on the Use of Mlhtary Force and its Relevyce to National Security Strategy," Naval War College Review 48 2 (1995) 86
South Korea, of course, shared many of the U S political and mihtary obJectives However, the focus of this paper will be on U.S obJectives and strategy. 
